Showing posts with label CIA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CIA. Show all posts

Thursday, May 7, 2009

TORTURE! Part 1: What Was Done

On April 16, the Obama Administration released the memos authored by Bush's Office of Legal Counsel that provided the legal rationale for torture.

Though this comparison seems a little over the top, the 2002 memo from Jay Bybee authorized "attention grasp, walling (hitting a detainee against a flexible wall), facial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, insects placed in a confinement box, and waterboarding."

Some in the CIA felt betrayed, "broken and bewildered" by the release of the memos. President Obama tried to allay these fears in his statement on the memos' release, saying:

In releasing these memos, it is our intention to assure those who carried out their duties relying in good faith upon legal advice from the Department of Justice that they will not be subject to prosecution...We must protect their identities as vigilantly as they protect our security, and we must provide them with the confidence that they can do their jobs.

Not one, not two, but three scientists cited in the memos objected to their work's inclusion. The scientists researched the effects of sleep deprivation, and their conclusions were used to support using sleep deprivation as an interrogation technique. But those who participated in their studies were (a) not deprived of sleep for as long as prisoners were (40 vs. 180 hours), (b) were in perfect health, and (c) were not simultaneously subjected to anything else.

The Bybee memo predicted that walling and cramped confinement would not constitute "serious physical injury." Compare to the Red Cross report:

Abu Zubaida's [often romanized as 'Zubaydah'] attorneys said he "has suffered approximately 175 seizures that appear to be directly related to his extensive torture -- particularly damage to Petitioner's head that was the result of beatings sustained at the hands of CIA interrogators and exacerbated by his lengthy isolation."...

"The stress on my legs held in this position [crouched in a confined wooden box] meant my wounds both in my leg and stomach became very painful," he told the ICRC.

The "learned helplessness" that psychologist James E. Mitchell believed was integral to a successful interrogation (even though he had never personally conducted one) leads to depression. ("You put an animal, human or non-human, in a situation in which bad things happen that it can neither escape nor control, and eventually it just gives up.") Furthermore:

Most of the released detainees, to this day, live with severe anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder, including intrusive recollections of trauma suffered in detention, hyperarousal (persistent symptoms of increased arousal, e.g., difficulty falling or staying asleep, anger, and hypervigilance), avoidance and emotional numbing behavior. PHR’s clinicians determined that these symptoms were directly related to the torture and ill-treatment reported having taken place while in US custody.

Sounds like "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" and "prolonged mental harm" (which constitute torture under US law) to me. So it's illegal, but was it, at least, effective?

Dick Cheney thinks so, and, bastion of openness that he is, thinks we should declassify "the memos that showed the success of the effort" so we could have an "honest debate."

However, it seems clear from items already in the public domain that torture techniques are ineffective and unnecessary. These techniques had, after all, solicited false statements when they were used on Americans in the Korean War.

A footnote in the 2005 Bradbury memo notes that:

The CIA, at least initially, could not always distinguish detainees who had information but were successfully resisting interrogation from those who did not actually have information. . . . On at least one occasion, this may have resulted in what might be deemed in retrospect to have been the unnecessary use of enhanced techniques.

Those who believe that information was acquired from torturing Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and used to foil a plot to attack the Library Tower in Los Angeles are completely wrong. The plot was foiled a full year before Sheikh Mohammed was even captured. (h/t)

And a former FBI agent (h/t) who interrogated Abu Zubaydah argues that:

There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than a few occasions.

But effectiveness is ultimately irrelevant:

If “effectiveness” is all we care about, any form of torture would necessarily be ok. One could, for instance, drag in a detainee’s child and begin torturing him or her in front of the detainee. I assume that even the most hardened torture advocates would draw a line there. If they didn’t, that tells you pretty much all you need to know.

But if they do concede that certain methods go too far (i.e., that such things are relevant), then they’re stuck having to argue that the methods we used simply
aren’t that bad. In other words, if they concede a line exists, then they’re forced to argue that these methods don’t cross it.

Sundry items of note:

  • The memos were only lightly redacted, in contrast with documents released by the Bush administration, which were so heavily redacted that the Onion joked that the CIA had been accidentally using black highlighters.
  • Glenn Greenwald: "Finally, it should be emphasized -- yet again -- that it was not our Congress, nor our media, nor our courts that compelled disclosure of these memos. Instead, it was the ACLU's tenacious efforts over several years which single-handedly pried these memos from the clutched hands of the government." (h/t)
  • Andrew Sullivan: "If you want to know how democracies die, read these memos." (h/t)

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

History 101 - Lessons of the Past

Boys and Girls, today in History 101 we are going to begin with the basics of how to understand historical mistakes and how not to repeat them. Due to recently escalating events in the Middle East, understanding the past mistakes is crucial to resolve conflicts in this region. Our case study for today is Iran. Let's begin with the historical events and then move to their implications in the modern day.

In March of 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh was democratically elected within the political structure of Iran and became prime minister. He enforced the Oil Nationalization Act, which involved the expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British company that monopolized Iran’s oil. Britain feared that Mossadegh was becoming too closely allied with Iran’s communist party, Tudeh, and that Soviet influence could spread to Iran. In 1952, British officials met with officials from the CIA and expressed Britain’s interest in a participating in a coup in Iran with the United States. In March of the following year, the CIA began to draft a plan called Operation AJAX that would overthrow Mossadegh and his administration through a covert action and establish a government that would cater to the United States and would remain open to British interests. Retired Iranian general Fazlolah Zahedi was chosen to be the replacement prime minister. In May of 1953, CIA officials in Tehran began a propaganda campaign against Mossadegh. On July 1, Churchill approved the final draft of the plan for the coup, and ten days later, U.S. President Eisenhower gave his approval. On August 15, the coup is begun but failed because Mossadegh had advanced warnings of a plot. Zahedi went into hiding and Shah Reza Pahlavi fled to Baghdad. On August 19, Zahedi led the coup while American CIA agents in Tehran created a riot against Tudeh and Mossadegh. The next day, Zahedi became Prime Minister, the Shah reassumed power, and members of Mossadegh’s government were in prison or in hiding. In 1954, the AIOC resumed its operations in Iran. Mossadegh was tried for treason, served three years in prison, and then placed under house arrest until his death on March 5, 1967.

The impact of the 1953 coup in Iran is extremely significant in assessing today’s strained relations with Iran. After the coup, Shah Reza Pahlavi regained power and became a puppet of the United States. Due to Iranians’ contempt for Pahlavi, a revolution broke out in 1979 that placed Ayatollah Khomeini in power. On November 4, 1979, militant students occupied the American embassy in Tehran and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. The United States ended diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. The Islamic Revolution in 1979 established the system of government Iran has today as well as gave way to the fundamentalist and conservative ideas embodied by the current Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran’s statements to the United States in regard to its nuclear program are clearly a reaction to the history of American and western manipulation in Iran as well as in the rest of the Middle East. As a result of American Cold War policy, Iran has a government the United States deems undemocratic and the country is impoverished due to control and manipulation of its economy and natural resources by the United States and its greatest ally, Britain. As Madeline Albright stated in March of 2000, “The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development and it is easy to see why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America,” (Risen, How a Plot Convulsed in Iran in ’53 [and in ’79]).

With President Bush and Ahmadinejad’s hostility towards one another and Bush’s current regime change policies as exhibited by the invasion of Iraq, an American-led regime change in Iran appears more likely to occur, given that the tensions between each nation are similar to what they were in 1953. Such action would create further instability in the region as well as destroy any hope of improving relations and resolving conflicts diplomatically. Currently, Ahmadinejad has angered the United States and other nations such as the United Kingdom with its developing nuclear program. The United States wants Iran to abandon its program while Iran insists that the program is simply for peaceful energy uses. However, with the capture of an Iranian diplomat on February 4, 2007 by uniformed gunmen in Baghdad, his accusations of torture, as well as the capture and release of fifteen British sailors recently, tensions continue to escalate and, due to historical policies, Ahmadinejad is not willing to efficiently compromise and Bush is refusing to pursue any diplomacy with Iran.

This tension is especially significant given the foreign policy of the Bush administration. Diplomacy between the United States and Iran is gravely needed in order to establish trust, improve relations, and to reach a compromise. "JustForeignPolicy.org" says it best:



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJRcOF7rEfQ



Now go tell Mommy and Daddy what you learned in school today.


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Works Cited/Consulted

Ahmadinejad’s ‘Gift’ to Britain. The WEEK. Volume 7, Issue 305. April 13, 2007. Page 4.

Barth, Linda. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003. Pages 37 – 42.

Buncombe, Andrew. Freed Iranian Diplomat Claims He was Tortured by the CIA in Iraq. April 9, 2007. The Independent. April 10, 2007.

Gasiorowski, Mark J. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004. Pages 227 – 246.

Iran. October 2006. U.S. Department of State. April 11, 2007.

Iraq: Should the War Have an End Date?. The WEEK. Volume 7, Issue 305. April 13, 2007. Page 6.

Oren, Michael B. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present. New York: Sike, Inc., 2007. Pages 479-483, 544-549.

Risen, James. How a Plot Convulsed in Iran in ’53 (and in ’79). 2000. The New York Times. April 10, 2007.

Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran. 2000. The New York Times. April 10, 2007.

Zabih, Sepehr. The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution. Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982. Pages 20 – 32.