Another Obama Speech

I'm so glad J-Mad covered Barack Obama's speech on race in America because the one he delivered today about Iraq in Fayetteville, North Carolina, caught my eye. Some excerpts:

If you believe we are fighting the right war, then the problems we face are purely tactical in nature. That is what Senator McCain wants to discuss – tactics. What he and the Administration have failed to present is an overarching strategy: how the war in Iraq enhances our long-term security, or will in the future. That's why this Administration cannot answer the simple question posed by Senator John Warner in hearings last year: Are we safer because of this war? And that is why Senator McCain can argue – as he did last year – that we couldn't leave Iraq because violence was up, and then argue this year that we can't leave Iraq because violence is down.

When you have no overarching strategy, there is no clear definition of success. Success comes to be defined as the ability to maintain a flawed policy indefinitely. Here is the truth: fighting a war without end will not force the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own future. And fighting in a war without end will not make the American people safer...

The central front in the war against terror is not Iraq, and it never was. What more could America's enemies ask for than an endless war where they recruit new followers and try out new tactics on a battlefield so far from their base of operations? That is why my presidency will shift our focus. Rather than fight a war that does not need to be fought, we need to start fighting the battles that need to be won on the central front of the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

If we have actionable intelligence about high-level al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan's border region, we must act if Pakistan will not or cannot. Senator Clinton, Senator McCain, and President Bush have all distorted and derided this position, suggesting that I would invade or bomb Pakistan...It is precisely this kind of political point-scoring that has opened up the security gap in this country. We have a security gap when candidates say they will follow Osama bin Laden to the gates of hell, but refuse to follow him where he actually goes. What we need in our next Commander in Chief is not a stubborn refusal to acknowledge reality or empty rhetoric about 3AM phone calls. What we need is a pragmatic strategy that focuses on fighting our real enemies, rebuilding alliances, and renewing our engagement with the world's people.

Amen.

TIME's Joe Klein reminds us, among other things, that, while presiding over the division and reconstruction of the post-World War I Ottoman Empire, Winston Churchill wrote to Prime Minister David Lloyd George, "We are paying 8 millions a year for the privilege of living on an ungrateful volcano."

The transcript of Obama's speech can be found here.

History 101 - Lessons of the Past

Boys and Girls, today in History 101 we are going to begin with the basics of how to understand historical mistakes and how not to repeat them. Due to recently escalating events in the Middle East, understanding the past mistakes is crucial to resolve conflicts in this region. Our case study for today is Iran. Let's begin with the historical events and then move to their implications in the modern day.

In March of 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh was democratically elected within the political structure of Iran and became prime minister. He enforced the Oil Nationalization Act, which involved the expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British company that monopolized Iran’s oil. Britain feared that Mossadegh was becoming too closely allied with Iran’s communist party, Tudeh, and that Soviet influence could spread to Iran. In 1952, British officials met with officials from the CIA and expressed Britain’s interest in a participating in a coup in Iran with the United States. In March of the following year, the CIA began to draft a plan called Operation AJAX that would overthrow Mossadegh and his administration through a covert action and establish a government that would cater to the United States and would remain open to British interests. Retired Iranian general Fazlolah Zahedi was chosen to be the replacement prime minister. In May of 1953, CIA officials in Tehran began a propaganda campaign against Mossadegh. On July 1, Churchill approved the final draft of the plan for the coup, and ten days later, U.S. President Eisenhower gave his approval. On August 15, the coup is begun but failed because Mossadegh had advanced warnings of a plot. Zahedi went into hiding and Shah Reza Pahlavi fled to Baghdad. On August 19, Zahedi led the coup while American CIA agents in Tehran created a riot against Tudeh and Mossadegh. The next day, Zahedi became Prime Minister, the Shah reassumed power, and members of Mossadegh’s government were in prison or in hiding. In 1954, the AIOC resumed its operations in Iran. Mossadegh was tried for treason, served three years in prison, and then placed under house arrest until his death on March 5, 1967.

The impact of the 1953 coup in Iran is extremely significant in assessing today’s strained relations with Iran. After the coup, Shah Reza Pahlavi regained power and became a puppet of the United States. Due to Iranians’ contempt for Pahlavi, a revolution broke out in 1979 that placed Ayatollah Khomeini in power. On November 4, 1979, militant students occupied the American embassy in Tehran and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. The United States ended diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. The Islamic Revolution in 1979 established the system of government Iran has today as well as gave way to the fundamentalist and conservative ideas embodied by the current Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran’s statements to the United States in regard to its nuclear program are clearly a reaction to the history of American and western manipulation in Iran as well as in the rest of the Middle East. As a result of American Cold War policy, Iran has a government the United States deems undemocratic and the country is impoverished due to control and manipulation of its economy and natural resources by the United States and its greatest ally, Britain. As Madeline Albright stated in March of 2000, “The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development and it is easy to see why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America,” (Risen, How a Plot Convulsed in Iran in ’53 [and in ’79]).

With President Bush and Ahmadinejad’s hostility towards one another and Bush’s current regime change policies as exhibited by the invasion of Iraq, an American-led regime change in Iran appears more likely to occur, given that the tensions between each nation are similar to what they were in 1953. Such action would create further instability in the region as well as destroy any hope of improving relations and resolving conflicts diplomatically. Currently, Ahmadinejad has angered the United States and other nations such as the United Kingdom with its developing nuclear program. The United States wants Iran to abandon its program while Iran insists that the program is simply for peaceful energy uses. However, with the capture of an Iranian diplomat on February 4, 2007 by uniformed gunmen in Baghdad, his accusations of torture, as well as the capture and release of fifteen British sailors recently, tensions continue to escalate and, due to historical policies, Ahmadinejad is not willing to efficiently compromise and Bush is refusing to pursue any diplomacy with Iran.

This tension is especially significant given the foreign policy of the Bush administration. Diplomacy between the United States and Iran is gravely needed in order to establish trust, improve relations, and to reach a compromise. "JustForeignPolicy.org" says it best:



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJRcOF7rEfQ


Now go tell Mommy and Daddy what you learned in school today.


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Works Cited/Consulted

Ahmadinejad’s ‘Gift’ to Britain. The WEEK. Volume 7, Issue 305. April 13, 2007. Page 4.

Barth, Linda. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003. Pages 37 – 42.

Buncombe, Andrew. Freed Iranian Diplomat Claims He was Tortured by the CIA in Iraq. April 9, 2007. The Independent. April 10, 2007.

Gasiorowski, Mark J. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004. Pages 227 – 246.

Iran. October 2006. U.S. Department of State. April 11, 2007.

Iraq: Should the War Have an End Date?. The WEEK. Volume 7, Issue 305. April 13, 2007. Page 6.

Oren, Michael B. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present. New York: Sike, Inc., 2007. Pages 479-483, 544-549.

Risen, James. How a Plot Convulsed in Iran in ’53 (and in ’79). 2000. The New York Times. April 10, 2007.

Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran. 2000. The New York Times. April 10, 2007.

Zabih, Sepehr. The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution. Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982. Pages 20 – 32.