Read Part 1 on Tunisia & Egypt and Part 2 on Libya & Bahrain.
Yemen
Change in rank in the Economist's Democracy Index: ↓ 3
The situation started to turn violent as protesters and Saleh supporters clashed on February 17. At least five were killed. 45 were killed by security forces and Saleh supporters as 100,000 marched through the streets of the capital Sana'a on March 18.
Meanwhile, the Gulf Cooperation Council attempted to broker a deal between opposition leaders and Saleh. Saleh waffled between supporting the process and vowing not to sign the deal. In late May, a breakdown in the GCC process triggered battles between Saleh loyalists and fighters under Sadiq al-Ahmar, the head of the Hashid tribe (to which Saleh belongs) who sympathized with the protesters. A cease-fire was agreed upon five days later.
The truce was short-lived. Four days later, fresh clashes erupted between Ahmar supporters and regime forces and loyalists. Simultaneously, the regime attempted to clear protesters from the city of Taiz, the heart of the protests, killing 50. And clashes erupted between security forces and al-Qaeda militants in the southern city of Zinjibar.
On June 3, a rocket attack on the presidential compound injured Saleh. Official statements initially downplayed his injuries, but two days later, Saleh was in Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Saleh's departure brought on celebrations and a drawdown in the fighting.
Attacks on protesters re-started on September 18. Over the next six days, at least 100 people were killed. On the 23rd, Saleh returned to Yemen.
In November, Saleh accepted the GCC deal. In exchange for stepping down, Saleh was to be granted immunity for any crimes committed as president. Yemen's Parliament officially granted Saleh--and his underlings--immunity in January. The deal has been criticized by human rights groups and Yemeni protesters. Saleh's vice president Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi was elected president in February with Saleh formally ceding power on February 27. Under the GCC deal, Hadi's government has two years to rewrite Yemen's constitution with fresh elections scheduled for 2014.
Though Saleh is officially out of power, Yemen's future is still uncertain. Separatists and extremists took advantage of the instability to consolidate their holds over parts of the countries. Houthis--Shiites in the predominantly Sunni Yemen--control the northwest. Southern separatists, wishing to undo the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen, control no territory but are capable of staging attacks against the government. They were responsible for attacks on polling stations during the February elections.
Most worrisome is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and their affiliate Ansar al-Sharia. They are widespread in the south and east. U.S. drone attacks have increased; at least 35 have likely taken place over the last year. Most famously, AQAP propagandist (and U.S. citizen) Anwar al-Awlaki was killed on September 30. Fighting between Yemeni forces and al-Qaeda militants is ongoing; today 6 Yemeni soldiers and 27 militants were killed.
More than any other Arab Spring country, Yemen sits on a knife's edge. On one side lies continuing strife between the various tribes and factions. On the other side, if southern and Shiite separatists can be co-opted by the new government, if AQAP can be defeated ideologically (i.e. not just militarily), if protesters continue to fight peacefully for their rights, then maybe, just maybe, Saleh's ouster can lead to a more democratic Yemen.
