Fo-Po Breakdown: Iran, USA, and a tad bit of Turkey

I am aware that this is sort of old news. However, since I have been busy lately and this is still an important on-going problem, I will write my blog post about it anyway. This began as a reaction to an op-ed in the New York Times, by Princeton doctoral candidate Elliot Hen-Tov and Princeton professor of Near Eastern Studies, Bernard Haykel. With the recent tightening of the newest sanctions on Iran this past Thursday, July 1, 2010, it is important to revisit this issue.

First, back to the op-ed from last month. In order to make any real headway on US-Iran relations, it is absolutely essential that each side really understand the other. For prominent scholars of prestigious universities, this also holds true. Which is why this article must be revisited – the Princeton people have it wrong. Their main assertion is that “Iran… stands to lose much influence as Turkey assumes a surprising new role as the modern, democratic and internationally respected nation willing to take on Israel and oppose America.” While parts of this statement are correct, the article represents a flawed understanding of Iranian politics and its relationship to the United States. Principally, it does not really matter for the United States (or Israel for that matter) what type of fiery rhetoric Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad uses – it is generally not directed at American or Israeli audiences anyway. The poll quoted by the authors, although irrelevant to their article, proves this point. The two major regional powers in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia, whose regime is a strong US ally, and Iran, whose regime clearly is not. When Ahmadinejad makes his statements in “support” of the Palestinian cause, he also does so bearing in mind that this can also play on Saudi Arabia’s weaknesses. Iran can claim to be the true supporter of Muslims in peril (despite a substantial number of Palestinians being of Christian or other backgrounds) while simultaneously making the Saudi regime appear weak to its people by alluding to its close relationship to the USA. In this manner, the Iranian regime hopes to remain dominant in the region over Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states.

Ahmadi-casual-Friday-nejad is not some “irrational, rouge leader” as realist IR theory would have us believe. The Iranian government’s support of Israel is mostly a domestic campaign to give the regime the appearance of standing up to the hegemonic rule of the United States and then Israel. Given the vastly superior military forces of both the USA and Israel, Iran would not risk attacking Israel. So, while these authors note that Turkey is seen by Palestinians as a much closer ally than Iran, it is crucial to understand that Iran’s political exploitation of this crisis is mostly for the purpose of bolstering domestic support for the regime and is targeted to domestic and Saudi, not international, audiences.

Secondly, I take issue with the Islam in Turkey being called “more liberal and enlightened.” Again, this is a fundamental mis-characterization of reality. While Saudi Arabia and Iran might be self-proclaimed Islamic states and Turkey a self-proclaimed secular state, the notion that any one regime is any more or less liberal/enlightened than the other is absurd when further examining their actual policies. In Iran, women are obligated to wear hijab at all times; in Turkey, there are laws making it illegal to wear the veil in some public places. Forcing people to appear secular is no better than forcing people to appear pious – these are merely two extreme ends of the spectrum. In a liberal Islam, it would seem that one would have the ability to choose without being compelled towards either end of such a spectrum. Furthermore, the fiercely secular and authoritarian policies enacted by the Turkish government can be just as bad as the authoritarian policies of Iran.

Returning to the sanctions and Turkey’s vote (along with Brasil), it is not really that much “against the United States” for Turkey to vote against the sanctions. The United States, while allies with Turkey, is far stronger allies with Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, with the United States’ help, has stronger military and economic ties to the USA, and it is closer to the other Arab states in the Middle East than Turkey is. With Turkey looking to gain membership to the European Union, it is smart to keep its options open for markets in the Middle East for the EU, but if push came to shove for the United States, I would bet that it would retain Saudi Arabia as its ally over Turkey. Anyway, Iran and Saudi Arabia are focused on each other and Turkey is focused on the EU, so it really does not matter for Iran what Turkey says – although its vote was nice anyway.

As stated in the BBC article, the sanctions imposed in June were not very substantial. This would suggest that the Obama administration is just reacting initially to [uneducated] domestic pressures in Congress to appear to be doing something about the Iranian nuclear program. While it is good that these sanctions were not substantial, it is also extremely damaging to any potential for improving diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran, only serving to prove Ahmadinejad correct when he claims that the United States is really not interested in changing the status quo. Bolstering domestic support for the current Iranian regime is the last thing that the United States should be doing.

In a more recent development, Nom Chomsky acknowledges that Iran poses a serious threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, despite citing sources earlier on in the article that discuss Iran’s relatively weak military capabilities; he just proposes different solutions instead of the United States “reinforcing [its] control of the vital Middle East oil-producing regions.” However, with Iran, this is not a valid argument either. Georgetown scholar Mehran Kamrava and University of Colorado professor Nader Hashemi are both of the opinion that Iran does not want to actually acquire a nuclear weapon. If Iran were to obtain the technology and actually produce a nuclear weapon, this would push Iran into a whole new realm of military prowess in which it would find itself on the bottom, easily bested several times over by the United States, Israel, etc. In other words, Iran can be a relatively strong conventional military power in the region, especially when compared to Saudi Arabia’s military on its own (aka minus USA support), but it would lose this advantage if it entered the nuclear arena and would find itself in a situation it cannot win. Thus, even the idea that Iran’s nuclear program to gain such knowledge is the most serious threat is absurd. The best solution would be to focus on finding common ground and interests within the Middle East between Iran and the United States (two really good examples here are Afghanistan and Iraq… hint, hint State Department) and go from here to rebuild diplomatic ties.

Speaking of best solutions, July 1^st was not one of these. The New York Times reports that President Obama signed a law in one of the few moments of consensus in Congress during his administration that “imposes penalties on foreign entities that sell refined petroleum to Iran or assist Iran with its domestic refining capacity. It also requires that American and foreign businesses that seek contracts with the United States government certify that they do not engage in prohibited business with Iran.” As stated several times before, the solution is to OPEN not close relations with Iran. This means diplomatically and economically. As Ahmadi-I-say-crazy-things-that-people-should-not-listen-to-nejad stated on June 28 that he would like to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States in August, giving the United States yet another opportunity to resume meaningful dialogue, the Obama administration missed it again and chose to respond to domestic pressures. This is where the State Department people need to step in and fix it.

Caving into absurd, ill-informed domestic pressures from a Congress that cannot even agree if sick people should get help to be less sick is certain to make the problem worse, not better. The Obama administration needs to focus on its priorities, improve its image in the Muslim world and the Middle East by closing Guantanamo and playing a meaningful role in improving the situation between Israel and Palestinian territories, and respecting the sovereignty of Iran and its government despite the outcome of the 2009 presidential elections. It is certainly not an easy task and will take time to produce the change promised by the Obama campaign, but it will be easier to accomplish with greater understanding of the nuances of regional politics in the Middle East and when the United States takes an active stance by following through on some good faith measures and working with Iran as a regional power in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the United States and Iran have a lot to gain from improving relations with one another and since the United States remains the global hegemonic power in this system of uni-multipolarity, it must responsibly take the first steps to initiate this process.